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MUST JOE ROBINSON DIE?: REFLECTIONS
ON THE 'SUCCESS' OF COURT PACKING
Robert A. Schapiro*
History may be radically contingent or it may be overde1
termined. Crushing a small creature may have drastic results, as
2
may saving the life of a person meant to die. On the other hand,
shootin~ a Tyrannosaurus rex may have no discernible effect on
history.
Are various constitutional episodes more like the butterfly,
seemingly slight, but producing dramatic effects, or like the dinosaur, seemingly grand, but which may be erased without a
trace? One need not find textualism extinct to conclude that in
this regard, constitutional language may be more dinosaur than
butterfly. A brief detour into non-counterfactual history presents the evidence. How would constitutional law change if the
words "equal protection of law" were removed from the Fifth
Amendment? Presumably, not very much. 4 What if the drafters
of the Eleventh Amendment had specified that the provision
barred only suits against states by citizens of other states?
* . Associate Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. My thanks to
Terry Gordon, J. Marcus Meeks, and Benjamin Sawyer for their skilled research assistance.
I. Sec Ray Bradbury, The Sound of Thunder, in The Golden Apples of the Sun 144
(Greenwood Press, 1953) (the killing of a pre-historic butterfly changes the course of history).
2. In the Star Trek episode, The City on the Edge of Forever, Dr. McCoy goes back
in time and saves the life of a social worker, Edith Keeler. Keeler goes on to delay the
entry of the United States into World War II, allowing Germany to conquer the world.
Captain Kirk's grim task is to return to the past and ensure that Keeler dies on schedule.
3. See Bradbury, The Sound of Thunder (cited in note 1). The story suggests that
the fabric of time would not be disturbed by shooting a dinosaur that would have died
shonly from other causes.
4. Compare U.S. Const., Amend. V (containing no equal protection clause) with
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) {finding equal protection component of due process clause). State constitutional interpretation demonstrates a similar tendency. See,
e.g., Hans A. Linde, Are State Constitutions Common Law?, 34 Ariz. L. Rev. 215, 220
(1992) {discussing the New Jersey Supreme Coun's use of due process and equal protection principles despite the absence of such textual provisions in the New Jersey Constitution).
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Again, res ipsa loquitur. In neither instance has the particular
constitutional language proved especially significant. But what
about grander constitutional events? Can altering one historical
conjuncture transform all that follows? To explore this question,
I consider one of the most notorious aspects of the twentieth
century's greatest constitutional momene President Franklin
Roosevelt's failed plan to "pack" the United States Supreme
Court.
Buoyed by a landslide victory in the election of 1936 and increasingly frustrated by a Supreme Court that was striking down
key features of the New Deal, President Roosevelt decided to
launch a frontal attack on the judicial opposition. On February
5, 1937, President Roosevelt presented a judicial reorganization
bill to Congress. The proposed legislation would have allowed
him to appoint an additional Justice to the United States Supreme Court for every member of the Court who refused to retire or resign within six months after turning 70. 7 The plan would
have given Roosevelt six appointments immediately and would
have permanently increased the size of the Court to 15.
In early July 1937, it appeared that some version of the
"court-packing" plan would likely become law.8 But all that
changed with an unexpected passing. On July 14, 1937, Joe
Robinson, the Majority Leader of the United States Senate who
spearheaded the President's congressional efforts, was found
9
dead in his bedroom, the apparent victim of a heart attack. The
10
reorganization plan died with the Majority Leader. What if
Senator Robinson had survived the grueling congressional debates and the torrid Washington summer and had shepherded
the President's proposal safely through Congress?
5. Compare U.S. Const., Amend. XI with Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,
54 (1996) ("Although the text of the Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article lii diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, 'we have understood the Eleventh
Amendment to stand not so much for what it says ... .' " (quoting Blatchford v. Native
Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775,779 (1991))).
6. I follow here Bruce Ackerman's typology of the three great constitutional moments, the Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal. See Bruce Ackerman, 1 We the
People: Foundations (Harvard U. Press, 1991).
7. Sec 81 Cong. Rec. 880-81 (1937).
8. Sec William E. Lcuchtcnburg, The Supreme Court Reborn: The Constitutional
Revolution in the Age of Roosevelt 148-50 (Oxford U. Press, 1995). Opinions on this matter vary. Sec Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court: The Structure of a Constitutional Revolution 24-25 (Oxford U. Press, 1998) (suggesting that the bill could not
have survived the opposition in both the Senate and the House).
9. Sec Joseph Alsop and Turner Catledge, The 168 Days 266-67 (DaCapo Press,
1938).
I 0. See Lcuchtcnberg, The Supreme Court Reborn at 152 (cited in note 8).
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The warnings of the bill's opponents could not have been
more dire. The Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee cautioned:
[The bill's] ultimate operation would be to make this Government one of men rather than one of law, and its practical
operation would be to make the Constitution what the executive or legislative branches of the Government choose to say
it is-an interpretation to be changed with each ... administration.11

Would passage of the bill have succeeded in undermining
the constitutional order? Would it have safeguarded the wishes
of the majority against an out-of-touch Court?
As it was, the proposal itself produced both substantial
benefits and extraordinary harms for the President. I would like
to suggest that a different disposition of the bill would not have
altered these consequences.
The plan exacted a heavy political toll, hindering the Presi12
dent's domestic and foreign policy agenda. President Roosevelt's dogged efforts to pass the court-packing plan energized his
opponents and alienated his friends. 1 An ultimate legislative
victory would not have appeased either group, nor would congressional approval have lessened the charges of interference
with the judiciary.
On the other hand, President Roosevelt believed that the
proposal achieved much of its purpose, even in defeat. He
termed his message of February 5 "a turning point in our modern history .... " 14 A leading historian of the period agrees that
"in the long history of the Supreme Court, no event has had
more momentous conse~uences than Franklin Roosevelt's message of February 1937." 5 In the famous "switch in time that
saved nine," the then-existing Court upheld important New Deal
legislation. 16 Deaths and retirements allowed Roosevelt to name
II. S. Rep. No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.% (1937) (reprinted in Louis Fisher and
Neal Devins, Political Dynamics of Constitutional Law 96 (West, 1992).
12. See Leuchtenberg, The Supreme Court Reborn at 156-61 (cited in note 8).
13. Sec id.
14. Sec 6 Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt (1937) reprinted in
Fisher and Devins, Political Dynamics at 86 (cited in note II).
15. Leuchtenberg, The Supreme Court Reborn at 162 (cited in note 8).
16. Some evidence suggests that the court-packing plan did not influence the
Court's decisions in these cases. Sec Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court at 18-25
(cited in note 8). Overall, the evidence as to the motivations for the "switch" has been
termed "equivocal." See Bruce Ackerman, 2 We the People: Transformations 343 (Harvard U. Press, 1998).
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seven Justices in the next five years. Ten years after his death, a
majority of the Justices remained Roosevelt appointees. It
seems hard to believe that a legislative success could have translated into a more favorable judicial reception for Roosevelt's
policies.
What would have been the longer term effects had Roosevelt's plan been enacted? With regard to the composition of the
Court, it is almost impossible to predict the consequences of either Roosevelt's initial proposal or a later compromise plan,
which would have allowed one additional appointment each cal17
endar year for every Justice over 75. One guesses that a larger
Court with more frequent appointments would dampen the influence of any single President, but reckoning the results requires a greater quantum mechanic than I. The effects of a plan
that did not change the size of the Court permanently might be
easier to trace. Consider for example, if the additional appointments at age 70 expanded the Court only temporarily until the
elder Justice departed. If one engages in some further simplifying assumptions, a dramatic effect does occur. 18
17. Sec Lcuchtenbcrg, The Supreme Court Reborn at 148 (cited in note 8).
18. For purposes of the next paragraph, I assume that a President could have appointed an additional Justice for every member of the Court who turned 70, but did not
step down during that presidency. For example, Justice Black's turning 70 in 1956 would
have given President Eisenhower an additional appointment. However, Justice Reed's
turning 70 in 1954 would not have given President Eisenhower an additional appointment
because President Eisenhower actually did appoint the replacement when Justice Reed
retired in 1957. Similarly, because President Nixon did name Justice Harlan's successor
in 1971, President Nixon would not have received an additional appointment on account
of Justice Harlan's turning 70 in 1969.
Further, in view of the potential for the opposition party to delay an appointment, I
assume that when a Justice attains the age of 70 after September in a presidential elec·
tion year, the President elected that November makes the appointment. Thus President
Eisenhower receives the benefit of Justice Frankfurter's turning 70 in November, 1952,
and President Nixon nominates an additional Justice because Justice Douglas turned 70
in October, 1968. On the other hand, because Justice Brennan attained 70 in April, 1976,
I give an additional appointment to President Ford. Transferring the Brennan appoint·
ment to President Carter would magnify the Carter windfall described later in the text.
Finally, I ignore the capacity of prior appointments to subtract from appointments
actually made. For example, President Kennedy's additional appointment when Chief
Justice Warren turned 70 in 1961 might have interfered with President Nixon's ability to
make an appointment when the Chief retired in 1969, but that problem is not taken into
account. In effect, this proviso unrealistically assumes that the additional appointee
would retire at the same time as the Justice who triggered the appointment.
My defense for these assumptions is that I believe they magnify, as well as clarify,
the effects of the plan, and my argument is that even these effects, though interesting, are
not ultimately substantial.
The following table lists the Justices who turned 70 after the Roosevelt administra·
tion, and the President who would have made the hypothetical additional appointments
under the above assumptions:
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Based on the ages of the 1ustices, such a plan, if adopted,
would have granted no additional appointments to Presidents
Truman and Johnson.
Presidents Kennedy, Nixon, Ford,
Reagan, Bush, and Clinton would each have gained one nominee. President Eisenhower would have gained two appointments. The most striking result would have been the change in
the fortunes of President Carter, who was one of only four
Presidents in history to make no appointments to the Supreme
Court. 19 Under the plan described above, President Carter

President Who
Would Receive
Hypothetical
Appointment
[no additional
appointment]
Eisenhower

Year Turned 70

Year of Actual
Retirement

Roberts

1945

1945

Frankfurter

1952

1962

Reed

1954

1957

Black

1956

1971

Burton

1958

1958

Warren

1961

1969

[no additional
appointment]
Kennedy

Douglas

1968

1975

Nixon

Harlan

1969

1971

Brennan

1976

1990

[no additional
appointment]
Ford

Burger

1977

1986

Carter

Powell

1977

1986

Carter

Blackmun

1978

1994

Carter

Marshall

1978

1991

Carter

White

1987

1993

Reagan

Stevens

1990

Bush

Rehnquist

1994

Clinton

Justice

19.

[no additional
appointment J
Eisenhower

The other three were Presidents William Henry Harrison, Zachary Taylor, and
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would have been able to name four Supreme Court Justices. 20 It
is exciting to speculate on how four Carter appointees might
have reshaped some of the major decisions of the 1980s, such as
McCleskey v. Kemp 21 and Bowers v. Hardwick. 22 Warren
McCleskey and Michael Hardwick might have had their claims
23
vindicated by a vote of 8-6. Justice Powell would have been a
simple dissenting voice, rather than a remorseful decisive vote. 24
I have used various assumptions to construct a scenario involving dramatic shifts in Court membership. Even with these
changes, though, would legal doctrine have been transformed
fundamentally? Would the Court really have stood in the way of
a nation bent on executing its fellow citizens? Perhaps a victory
for Hardwick would have undermined various forms of social
and legal discrimination, but again it is hard to say. At least in
the currently debated context of the military, it seems doubtful,
and outside of that context, Bowers provided no obstacle to Romer.25 Moreover, while Carter appointments might have created
precedential barriers for the Rehnquist Court, the Reagan judicial revolution fizzled anyway. Robert Bork might have been a
26
revolutionary; Anthony Kennedy is not.
Andrew Johnson. Sec John M. Lawlor, Court Packing Revisited: A Proposal for Rationalizing the Timing of Appointments 10 the Supreme Court, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 967,968 n.9
(1986 ). Of these, only President Carter served a full four-year term.
20. Perhaps it would be less convoluted merely to note that 1907 and 1908 produced a bumper crop of four Supreme Court Justices: Justices Marshall, Burger, Powell,
and Blackmun. Justice Brennan, born in April, 1906,just missed this boom.
21. 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (5-4 decision rejecting challenge to alleged racially discriminatory administration of capital sentencing scheme).
22. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (5-4 decision allowing criminal prosecution of homosexual
sodomy).
23. This tally conservatively assumes that President Ford's hypothetical additional
appointment would vote with the majority. President Ford's actual appointment, Justice
Stevens, voted with the dissent in these cases.
24. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 451, 530 (Scribners, 1994)
(discussing Justice's Powell's expressing regret at these decisions after his retirement).
25. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down state constitutional
amendment that prohibited laws barring discrimination based on sexual orientation); see
id. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that majority opinion fails to mention, much less
distinguish, Bowers).
26. See Ackerman, We the People: Transformations at 394-95 (cited in note 16); see
also Bruce A. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1164 (1988).
It is also difficult to predict how President Carter's nominees actually would have shifted
the Court. President Carter's Attorney General, Griffin Bell, spent much energy battling
what he perceived to be the liberal wing of the Democratic Party, as embodied in VicePresident Mondale. Sec Griffin B. Bell with Ronald J. Ostrow, Taking Care of the Law
23-36 (William Morrow, 1982). These fights sometimes extended to the issue of judicial
nominations. See id. at 40-42. As for Attorney General Bell's views on nominations, see
id. at 40-41 ("So successful were we in placing women on the bench ... that I thought the
need for affirmative action in picking federal judges had run its course.").
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Aside from specific nominees, would the adoption of President Roosevelt's proposal have undermined judicial independence, indeed threatened the rule of law? Again, the overwhelming message of the episode appears to be that the Court,
through appointment or otherwise, eventually follows the lead of
a President who helps to engineer a real constitutional revolution. A President who attempts to alter the appointment
mechanism pays a steep political price.
Perhaps these brief reflections merely emphasize that if one
looks for constitutional revolutions, particular nominations are
dinosaurs, mattering much less than the fluttering political realities. I believe that this message, if true, should be reassuring to a
democracy.
Let Joe Robinson live. The nation would survive. 27

27. Indeed, had Robinson lived and managed to push the President's plan through
Congress, th1s conservative southern Democrat might have received the Supreme Court
nommauon that Roosevelt had apparently promised to him, but gave to Hugo Black.
Sec Leuchtenberg, The Supreme Court Reborn at 180 (cited in note 8). In view of the
comparative political dispositions of Black and Robinson, a dead Senator Robinson thus
might have done more to assure robust judicial support for the New Deal revolution than
a living (Justice) Robinson.

